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VERTICAL RESTRAINTS WITH HORIZONTAL




George Orwell's novel Animal Farm recounts the course of a revolution
against the discredited old order on Farmer Jones's Manor Farm. The
victorious animals developed a carefully crafted and sensible set of rules
to govern their own new order-the Seven Commandments. But the
Seven Commandments were hard for most of the animals to remember.
After much thought, one of the farm's leading intellectuals, a pig named
Snowball, declared that the Seven Commandments could be reduced to
a single maxim: "Four legs good, two legs bad." This seductive simplifica-
tion was the beginning of the end for the animal revolution. In the name
of this maxim, the pigs perverted each of the Seven Commandments,
one after the other, to reestablish the old prerevolutionary order with
themselves, rather than the farmer, on top.
Antitrust revolutions, too, can founder on oversimplification. The Chi-
cago School revolution of the last twenty years uprooted and discarded
old, oversimplified per se rules and rubrics because they discouraged
efficient conduct. One theme of the Chicago revolutionaries was to focus
antitrust attention on how collusion-that is, horizontal arrangements-
can harm competition and consumers. Thus, they advocated reorienting
enforcement to emphasize prosecuting price fixing and enjoining hori-
zontal mergers that threaten to create monopolies or near monopolies.
Yet, the Chicago revolution also taught how vertical arrangements
between sellers and buyers can achieve efficiencies. One of the most far-
reaching doctrinal shifts attributable to the Chicago revolution was the
Supreme Court's rejection of the per se prohibition against vertically
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imposed territorial restraints in GTE Sylvania.' By treating these re-
straints under the rule of reason, the Court permitted manufacturers
to write contracts that induce dealer sales effort by discouraging dealer
free riding on the promotional efforts of neighboring retailers. Other
decisions have effectively relaxed old per se rules against other vertical
arrangements, principally tying.2 Some enthusiastic commentators have
advocated reversing all the old rules and treating vertical arrangements,
including agreements setting resale prices, as per se legal. 3 These devel-
opments could reduce to a deceptively simple maxim: "Vertical good,
horizontal bad."4 If antitrust were to follow that maxim, it would give a
free pass to all kinds of agreements between firms and their distributors
or suppliers, while closely scrutinizing agreements among competitors.
Each side of the "vertical good, horizontal bad" maxim is an oversimpli-
fication. The "horizontal bad" half underplays the many important ways
in which collaboration among competitors can achieve efficiencies. To
be sure, another legacy of the Chicago revolution was a more nuanced
treatment of horizontal restraints as well. Decisions like BMI
5 and Rothery6
move away from per se treatment of some horizontal restraints expressly
to permit efficiencies.7
This article focuses on the "vertical good" half of the maxim. This
slogan understates the competitive problems that can result from vertical
restraints. Even believers in "vertical good, horizontal bad" should still
pay attention to vertical restraints-not because "vertical" is by itself
"bad," but because vertical restraints can impair horizontal competition.
This article describes three ways in which vertical restraints can harm
competition by having horizontal effects, here termed "facilitating prac-
tices," "raising rivals' costs," and "dampening competition." Pointing
' Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
'Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-
Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
3 Richard Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se
Legality, 48 U. CHI. L REV. 6 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (1984) (prescribing a series of decision "filters" to identify practices that antitrust
law should not challenge; virtually all vertical practices, including resale price maintenance,
would usually thus be exempted).
4 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 405-06 (1978).
' Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
6 Rothery Storage & Van Lines Co., v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
7 Some commentators, recognizing this principle but then taking it to its extreme, might
have restated the maxim as "vertical good, and horizontal good too." See, e.g., DOMINICK
T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1986).
8 These do not catalogue all the ways vertical restraints can harm competition. For
example, this list excludes the way regulated firms can raise prices by evading regulatory
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out the anticompetitive potential of vertical practices is not intended to
minimize their efficiency benefits; it is instead merely intended to high-
light the part of the story that has not been emphasized in recent years.
The three kinds of anticompetitive effects will be illustrated with exam-
ples from antitrust cases involving one particular kind of vertical re-
straint, namely, most-favored-customer clauses.
II. MOST-FAVORED-CUSTOMER PROVISIONS
Analyzing vertical restraints is complicated by the variety of forms
they take.9 The most-favored-customer clause is a good example because
it is familiar and common and it has been frequently subject to antitrust
attention.
A most-favored-customer clause, also called an "antidiscrimination"
or a "most-favored-nations" clause, is a promise by one party, for example
a supplier, to treat a buyer as well as the supplier treats its best, "most-
favored" customer.' ° If the supplier lowers price to someone else, then
the buyer's price will be lowered to match. The immediate effect of a
most-favored-customer clause is uniformity in how one supplier treats
different customers.
In applying rule of reason antitrust analysis to vertical restraints such
as a most-favored-customer clause, the anticompetitive effects must be
identified and compared with efficiencies. This article will describe three
anticompetitive mechanisms by which a most-favored-customer clause
in vertical contracts could harm competition, one corresponding to each
of the general vertical theories previously noted: practices facilitating
coordination, raising rivals' costs, or dampening competition. This arti-
cle's broader purpose-of highlighting the many ways vertical practices
can harm competition-is, in one respect, not well served by focusing
constraints and the way vertical integration can facilitate anticompetitive price discrimi-
nation.
9 The most familiar vertical relationships are between manufacturers and retailers or
between manufacturers and input suppliers. Designation of one level as "upstream" and
the other level as "downstream" is convenient conceptually, but is arbitrary. For example,
retailers are treated generally as "downstream" of manufacturers. But retailers could be
treated equally as "upstream" suppliers to the manufacturers of a key input, namely,
retailing services. In general, vertical relationships are those among sellers of goods or
services that are complements to each other in demand, while horizontal relationships are
those among sellers of substitutes in demand.
" A most-favored-customer provision may appear expressly in a (vertical) supply con-
tract. In other cases a seller will establish a most-favored-customer policy for all its buyers
across-the-board. In the latter situation the vertical contract is implicit. If competing sellers
agree that each will announce a most-favored-customer policy, they have reached a hori-
zontal agreement to introduce a vertical practice. Most-favored-customer provisions can
be retroactive or contemporaneous.
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upon most-favored-customer provisions: the distinction between the fa-
cilitating practices and dampening competition theories could be made
more apparent by choosing some other vertical practice for study. On
the other hand, the goal of encouraging careful analysis of individual
practices rather than careless application of slogans is well served: this
article will explain why some, though not all, of the commonly supposed
efficiency benefits of most-favored-customer provisions may not be per-
suasive.
III. FACILITATING HORIZONTAL COORDINATION
The first kind of competitive effect to be concerned about is the use of
most-favored-customer provisions to facilitate anticompetitive horizontal
coordination." Coordination works better if firms have little incentive
to cheat to begin with. Most-favored-customer clauses can create that
condition. A firm that has agreed to offer most-favored-customer treat-
ment in its contracts has reduced its incentive to deviate from a coordi-
nated horizontal arrangement because it cannot limit its discounts to a
single customer.2
The seller's reduced incentive to negotiate price cuts to individual
buyers is complemented by a lessening of buyer efforts to drive a hard
bargain. 3 After all, a buyer likely has less incentive to invest in negotiating
with a seller who will find it expensive to discount. Buyers' complemen-
tary disincentive to bargain hard can be exacerbated when many other
buyers also have most-favored-customer provisions: a customer who re-
sells further downstream may have less incentive to bargain aggressively
" This article uses the term "facilitating practices" to refer to conduct that would permit
firms to achieve higher prices in a noncooperative repeated game framework and the term
"dampening competition" to refer to conduct that would lead to higher prices in a static
setting. "Facilitating practices" may work by helping competitors, including the members
of a horizontal cartel, monitor each others' behavior to detect whether they are cheating
on each other; by increasing the punishment for cheating; or by making it easier for firms
to reach a consensus on prices and outputs.
12 Steven C. Salop, Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination, in NEw DEVELOP-
MENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 265 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathew-
son eds., 1986); Joseph J. Simons, Fixing Price with Your Victim: Efficiency and Collusion with
Competitor-Based Formula Pricing Clauses, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 599 (1989). A most-favored-
customer policy could also facilitate coordination through a second route: through an-
nouncing such a policy a seller could establish itself as a price leader. Mark T.L. Sargent,
Economics Upside Down: Low Price Guarantees as Mechanisms for Facilitating Tacit Collusion,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2075-80 (1993); cf. Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section
I Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38
ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 162-69 (1993) (firms may employ focal rules as a form of "cheap
talk" to negotiate the terms of coordination).
" Thomas Cooper & Timothy Fries, The Most-Favored-Nation Pricing Policy and Negotiated
Prices, 9 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 209 (1991).
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with the seller when doing so will not give it a competitive advantage
over other buyers.14
To facilitate horizontal coordination among sellers, it may be enough
for a firm to offer most-favored-customer protection only to major cus-
tomers, or even a single major customer-as the court recognized in the
old polio vaccine case. 5 The court refused to treat uniform high prices
as evidence of criminal conspiracy where the largest purchaser, the gov-
ernment, insisted on most-favored-customer clauses. 16 Industry witnesses
pointed out that the most-favored-customer clauses set a price floor and
they would be reluctant to cut price to any customer because they would
then have to cut price to the federal government and to states with
similar clauses in their contracts.
17
The Federal Trade Commission addressed the potential for most-
favored-customer clauses to facilitate coordination in a recent consent
settlement with RxCare, the leading pharmacy network in Tennessee. 8
Pharmacies in a network contract with health plans to sell drugs to
consumers are reimbursed by the pharmacy benefit management firms
(PBMs) and managed care providers who sponsor the health plan with
which the consumer is affiliated. RxCare fills prescriptions for patients
covered by the state Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans and for consumers
affiliated with several other managed care organizations.
RxCare required participating pharmacists, which accounted for more
than 95 percent of all pharmacies in the state, to agree that if they
accepted a lower reimbursement rate from a competing network, they
would accept the same rate from RxCare. Because RxCare is owned
by the largest pharmacists' organization in the state, the most-favored-
customer clauses were effectively imposed by the pharmacists upon them-
selves.
14 Moreover, a buyer who knows that its own competitive position will not be undermined
by rivals who get better prices from a key supplier may compete less strongly at the buyer
level.
'" United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1959 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,536 (D.N.J. 1959).
16 For a discussion of the problem of inferring an agreement to fix price in parallel
pricing cases, see Baker, supra note 12.
"? United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1959 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,536, at 76,152 (D.N.J.
1959). The court cited, as further evidence of the price-floor effect, that when the practical
impact of the clauses ended in late 1957, discounting broke out. Id. at 76,152-53. But cf.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1415 (7th
Cir. 1995) (Posner, C. J.) (terming a price-floor theory similar to what was suggested in
the polio case "an ingenious but perverse argument"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996).




The FTC concluded that these contractual provisions tended to keep
reimbursement rates high by discouraging selective discounting and the
development of rival networks. According to the Commission, the clauses
discouraged pharmacists from joining networks promising additional
business but offering a lower reimbursement rate-that is, they discour-
aged pharmacists from cutting price to attract new business-even
though RxCare was nominally nonexclusive. The reason: the pharmacists
would then be required to cut price to the RxCare network, which is the
largest source of third-party business for Tennessee pharmacies. Third-
party payers could not plausibly avoid the high price implications of
the most-favored-customer clause by assembling a rival network that
excluded RxCare pharmacists because almost all of the state's pharma-
cists were RxCare members. And because RxCare was owned by a phar-
macists' association, it had less incentive than would an independent
network to bargain aggressively with its pharmacist members in order
to offer low reimbursement rates to third-party payers. To the contrary,
RxCare actually sought to persuade third-party payers to raise their
reimbursement rates to the RxCare level. These anticompetitive incen-
tives were significant: according to the complaint, reimbursement rates
were higher in Tennessee than in other states.
The facilitating coordination effects of most-favored-customer clauses
were also one object of the FTC's Ethyl litigation. 9 The Commission
challenged an industry-wide pattern of offering most-favored-customer
protection as one of three practices that allegedly led to supracompetitive
prices. 20 The administrative law judge found that the clauses, used by
the two largest firms in the industry, reduced those sellers' incentive to
discount and increased each of these major sellers' confidence that the
other would not discount. The Commission agreed that the disincentive
to discount was obvious-it was reflected in the companies' own docu-
ments-and it rejected the respondents' claims that they would have set
the same high prices even without the clauses. The court of appeals
dismissed the complaint, however, principally because the Commission
did not allege that the firms had used these practices to accomplish tacit
collusion, but instead claimed that each firm had violated Section 5 of the
FTC Act by adopting the practices unilaterally.2" The appellate opinion
nevertheless acknowledged the anticompetitive potential of most-
'9 Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425, 628-32 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
20 The other practices were delivered pricing and advance announcements of upcoming
price changes.




favored-customer provisions, noting that the seller "voluntarily penalizes
itself for price discounting."2
The Department of Justice's consent order prohibiting anticompetitive
practices in the electrical equipment industry was also concerned with the
potential for most-favored-customer clauses to facilitate coordination.2"
IV. RAISING RIVALS' COSTS
The second kind of horizontal effect from vertical practices is exclu-
sion, or, more generally, raising rivals' costs. Vertical restraints can harm
competition by creating conditions in which downstream firms must
participate, or accede to, what we might call an involuntary or coerced
cartel.24 The restraints may increase the marginal costs of some down-
stream firms, inducing them to reduce output and raise price. Then, the
remaining downstream firm or firms can reduce output to raise price
without fear that these rivals will undermine the involuntary cartel by
discounting.
To illustrate the way raising rivals' costs stories work, suppose that
three firms, A, B, and C are the only horizontal competitors in a market
protected from entry. For collusion to succeed, it may be assumed, all
three firms must reduce output and raise price; collusion would fail if
one firm, let us say firm C, refused to go along. 5 The other two firms,
A and B, may nonetheless be able to achieve the anticompetitive result
if they can raise C's marginal costs. Higher costs would induce C to
reduce output and raise price. With C forced to do the same thing that
A and B want to do, namely, reduce output and raise price, A's and B's
coordinated output reduction could succeed. 6
22 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 140 n.10 (2d Cir. 1984).
21 United States v. General Elec. Co., 42 Fed. Reg. 17,005 (1977) (prohibiting the use
of most-favored-customer price-protection clauses and advance price announcements).
The firms had previously been convicted of price fixing. United States v. General Elec.
Co., 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,503 (1962).
24 The possibility of such an involuntary anticompetitive arrangement is well established
in the economics literature. Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80
AM. EcoN. REv. 127 (1990); Steven Salop & David Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36
J. INDUS. EcoN. 19(1987); Oliver Williamson, Wage Rates as aBarrier to Entry: The Pennington
Case in Perspective, 82 Q.J. ECON. 85 (1968); Richard Nelson, Increased Rents from Increased
Costs: A Paradox of Value Theory, 65 J. POL. EcoN. 357 (1957).
25 Firm C, the rival whose costs are increased, need not be an incumbent producer. It
could instead be a firm whose potential entry constrains anticompetitive behavior. Then,
the remaining downstream firms can reduce output to raise price without fear of new
competition. In this case, the vertical restraints harm competition by increasing the costs
of potential downstream entrants, removing a constraint on incumbent producers by
discouraging entry.
26 Of course, if firm C wanted to go along with collusion anyway, A and B would not
need to take any action to raise its costs. But firm C may have different incentives than A
19961
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One way to raise C's marginal costs would be to foreclose C's access
to inexpensive inputs or distribution. A and B might accomplish this by
entering into contracts with input suppliers or distributors that contained
terms effectively limiting C's access. Vertical merger between A or B and
suppliers or distributors, used to foreclose access by the unintegrated
firm C, may also have this effect.2"
For a vertical restraint to implement the involuntary cartel strategy
successfully, three conditions must hold: the benefits of the strategy to
the firms undertaking it must exceed their costs; those firms must not
cheat on each other; and their target must be unable to avoid the strategy.
None of these conditions is necessarily impossible to satisfy.
The first condition requires that the benefits to A and B exceed the
costs they themselves incur in raising C's costs. It is not difficult to imagine
settings in which this condition would be satisfied. Although it may be
expensive for A and B to arrange for C's costs to rise, their prospective
monopoly profits from successfully raising price may be great enough
to make the expenditure worthwhile.2" Indeed, if A obtains a large frac-
tion of the producer benefits from higher prices-if A's market share is
large, for example-A may even find it worthwhile to pay all of those
costs itself, without help from B.
The second condition requires that A and B avoid the temptation to
cheat on their involuntary cartel. That is, deviation sufficient to under-
mine the involuntary cartel must be deterred." Determining whether
this condition is met is a familiar inquiry for antitrust: A's and B's incentive
and ability to deviate from the involuntary cartel they have imposed on
C are unlikely to be greater than if C had agreed to join the scheme
voluntarily. 0 Indeed, if firm B faces capacity constraints or other barriers
to expansion, or if the industry consists only of firms A and C, A need
and B, making it a "maverick" firm whose presence in the market otherwise constrains A
and B from raising price. See Baker, supra note 12, at 202-03.
27 See generally Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 253-66 (1986) (identifying ways
that C's marginal costs might rise).
25 Cf. id. at 273-77 (the horizontal rivals that benefit from an involuntary cartel may
find it necessary to share their monopoly profits with sophisticated suppliers).
29 The technical literature makes this point by asking whether A and B would be able
to commit to the exclusionary policy. See David Reiffen, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure:
Comment, 82 AM. EcON. REV. 694 (1992); Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration
and Market Foreclosure, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (MICROECONOMICS)
205, 257 (1990).




not coordinate with any rival in order to achieve higher prices by raising
C's costs.
The final condition instructs that for A's and B's involuntary cartel to
succeed, C must be unable to avoid the cost increases by, for example,
outbidding A or B for access to a key input or distribution channel.
This condition, too, might plausibly be satisfied in many specific factual
settings. For example, firm C may well be unable to offer as much as A
or B. Firms A and B can offer to share some of the cartel profits with
the input supplier. By contrast, C cannot offer to share cartel profits
because if C avoids the foreclosure or cost increase, collusion fails and
the competitive price will prevail."' Moreover, even if firm C could bribe
the input supplier not to be excluded, paying that bribe may itself raise
C's marginal costs and thus lead to the input reduction necessary to make
the involuntary cartel successful (unless the bribe were to take the form
of a lump-sum payment, unrelated to the level of C's purchases from
the input supplier).,2 Although customers may have an incentive to help
C avoid the foreclosure, 3 they need not be able or willing to do so.
Indeed, customers' ability to assist C's counterstrategy in an involuntary
cartel setting is unlikely to be greater than their ability to undermine a
voluntary cartel by sponsoring entry. In a market with many buyers, for
example, no individual customer may have sufficient incentive to sponsor
entry. Doing so would be costly, and each customer would recognize that
most of the benefits of sponsoring entry would accrue to its rivals rather
than itself.
34
Most-favored-customer clauses could be weapons in a strategy to im-
pose an involuntary cartel. Firms that demand and get most-favored-
customer treatment from important input suppliers are assured that new
entrants and existing competitors will not be able to obtain lower costs
by getting better prices from those suppliers. By reducing the ability of
entrants or rivals to lower their costs, firms can achieve or maintain prices
above competitive levels.
Antitrust cases have considered the threat of this kind of harm in
the context of large health insurance plans demanding most-favored-
customer protection in contracts with hospitals or doctors. Two leading
" See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 27, at 268-72 (describing conditions under
which rivals' counterstrategies would not be successful).
32 Id.
33 See David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Buyers' Strategies, Entry Barriers, and Competi-
tion, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 418 (1992).
3' In recognition of this difficulty, the foreclosure or raising rivals' costs problem is
sometimes described as reducing competition by requiring two-level entry.
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cases point in opposite directions. 5 In the Reazin case, Blue Cross had
terminated its provider contract with the largest hospital in Wichita,
Kansas, after that hospital affiliated with a major, for-profit chain and a
sizable health maintenance organization.36 Blue Cross' standard provider
contract included a most-favored-customer clause.37 Although Reazin did
not address the legality of the most-favored-customer provision-the
litigation mainly concerned the propriety of terminating the hospital's
affiliation with Blue Cross, the jury relied on the effects of that clause-
the way it discouraged price discounting and thus the entry of new
competition-as evidence that Blue Cross had market power."
A similar scenario appeared in the Ocean State case,39 where the legality
of the most-favored-customer provision was at issue, but the Ocean State
outcome points in the opposite direction from Reazin. In Ocean State the
Blue Cross plan demanded most-favored-customer terms from physi-
cians who also affiliated with a new health maintenance organization
35 See Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints Among Hospitals, Physicians and Health Insurers
that Raise Rivals' Costs, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 147 (1988) (analyzing district court opinions);
Arnold C. Celnicker, A Competitive Analysis of Most Favored Nations Clauses in Contracts Between
Health Care Providers and Insurers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 863 (1991).
36 Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 970-71 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).
37 A fact-finder in Reazin could reasonably have concluded that Blue Cross, which insured
roughly 60% of patients statewide, id. at 969, harmed competition by terminating the
hospital that affiliated with a rival health insurer. That act discouraged other hospitals
from affiliating with competing health insurers, thereby deterring prospective competitors
from entering the health care financing business and protecting Blue Cross' health care
financing monopoly. Id. at 966; Baker, supra note 35, at 163-66. The most-favored-cus-
tomer provision, by which participating hospitals agreed not to give a competing health
insurer a lower rate than they gave Blue Cross, could have contributed to entry deterrence
by limiting the ability of prospective competitors to obtain lower-cost hospital services.
In the alternative a fact-finder could have concluded that Blue Cross harmed competition
in the hospital market by raising the costs of a hospital that sought to deviate from a
hospital cartel. Id. (The loss of Blue Cross subscribers might have forced the terminated
hospital to operate at a less efficient scale.) If so, Blue Cross harmed competition by helping
its affiliated hospitals create an involuntary hospital cartel (presumably in exchange for a
share of the resulting monopoly profits).
'8 Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 971 & n.30 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990). The jury found that Blue Cross had conspired
with the smaller hospitals in Wichita, which agreed to accept a lower reimbursement level
from Blue Cross if Blue Cross would cancel the large hospital's contract and thus steer
more patients its way. Id. at 964 & n.18. Thus, the most-favored-customer clauses were
considered in the context of collusion under § I of the Sherman Act. Although Blue Cross
was also found liable for monopolization under § 2, only the contract termination and
price cut, and not the most-favored-customer clauses, were cited as monopolizing acts. Id.
at 972-73. The jury findings of monopoly power and its willful maintenance were sustained
on appeal. Id.
9 Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 692 F.




(HMO). The HMO's payment schedule to physicians contemplated shar-
ing profits, if any. If the HMO was not profitable, its effective payment
rate to physicians was lower than what Blue Cross paid. 0 Under the
most-favored-customer contracts, the HMO's physicians would then also
have to accept lower payment from Blue Cross. The implication was
clear, as was the result: hundreds of doctors terminated their affiliation
with the HMO after Blue Cross insisted on these terms.4' But both the
trial judge and the First Circuit were reluctant to label as monopolization,
in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a tactic that, on its face,
42looked like it was designed to ensure low prices.
Federal and state enforcers have been actively scrutinizing the use of
most-favored-customer clauses in health care contracts to discourage
entry by raising rivals' costs. In the Delta Dental of Arizona4 case, for
40 Ocean State withheld 20% of its physician fees until the end of the year, paying them
to affiliated doctors only if the HMO's revenues exceeded costs.
"' Two anticompetitive scenarios seemed possible on the record recounted in the opinion
below, although neither was endorsed by the trial court, which entered a judgment in
favor of the Blue Cross plan notwithstanding ajury verdict for the HMO. First, Blue Cross
may have achieved or preserved market power in health insurance by forcing the HMO
below efficient scale. (At a small scale, an HMO may be unprofitable. Without the ability
to direct a significant number of patients to providers, it cannot negotiate discounts from
hospitals and doctors. Yet without low input prices, it cannot keep premiums low enough
to attract a significant number of patients.) Alternatively, if Blue Cross were controlled
by doctors, it may have protected market power in physician services by making it uneco-
nomic for doctors to lower their fees to those patients participating in the HMO. See
generally Baker, supra note 35, at 166-69.
42 See also Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406,
1415 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C. J.) (assuming without analysis that a most-favored-customer
clause in a medical clinic's contract with affiliated physicians would help the clinic bargain
with doctors for low prices), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996); Kitsap Physicians Serv. v.
Washington Dental Serv., 671 F. Supp. 1267 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (monopolization challenge
to most-favored-customer clause in dental plan contract rejected because the policy was
not "predatory" or anticompetitive, but rather was justified by normal business purpose
and not enforced arbitrarily; moreover, there was no dangerous probability of success
because defendant had at most a 22% market share); Madden v. California Dental Serv.,
1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,176 (Cal. S. Ct., 1986) (Cartwright Act challenge to price
policies of CDS, including a nondiscrimination clause, rejected after rule of reason analysis;
in balancing the procompetitive effects of assuring low prices and the anticompetitive
effect of discouraging discounting, plaintiffs' offer of proof was limited to a theory about
motivation and no evidence was offered to show a possible injury to members of the
plaintiff class); Willamette Dental Group v. Oregon Dental Serv. Corp., 882 P.2d 637 (Or.
App. 1994) (court rejects argument that most-favored-customer clauses should be per se
legal, but finds no evidence that defendants' enforcement of such a clause unreasonably
excluded competition).
" United States v. Delta Dental Plan of Ariz., Inc., 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,048
(D. Ariz. 1995). The complaint alleged that enforcement of the clause led many dentists
to stop discounting or to resign from competing dental plans and that it deterred entry
by other plans. TheJustice Department has challenged a similar scheme involving a national
eye care insurer. United States v. Vision Serv. Plan, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,775
(D.D.C. 1994) (proposed final judgment).
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example, the Justice Department and the State of Arizona challenged
the enforcement of a most-favored-customer requirement by a health
plan that had signed up 85 percent of the dentists in the state. The
Justice Department recently filed a Sherman Act Section 1 complaint
challenging a similar contract provision in the agreements between Delta
Dental of Rhode Island, Rhode Island's largest dental insurer, and 90
percent of the dentists actively practicing in that state."
V. DAMPENING COMPETITION
Vertical restraints can harm horizontal competition through a third
route: by dampening competition directly. A party to a vertical restraint
may appear to be imposing a burden on itself, limiting its own range of
competitive options.45 That burden can constitute a commitment to take
strategic action that will encourage anticompetitive cooperation or dis-
courage vigorous competition by its horizontal rivals. In particular, in
46some industries, a commitment to conduct that appears less aggressive
will lead rivals to see that their best interest is allowing industry prices
to rise.47 The practices generating the commitments could have greater
power when they are adopted by most or all the firms in an industry.
The State of Pennsylvania also considered these issues a few years ago, when Blue
Cross proposed to negotiate most-favored-customer protection from hospitals. The state
insurance commissioner decided to limit the duration of the provision because of concerns
that it would harm competition. The Department of Justice contributed to that decision,
with a letter describing the possible competitive problems. Letter from Anne K. Bingaman,
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to Hon. Cynthia
M. Maleski, Insurance Commissioner, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Sept. 7, 1993) (on
file with the author).
" Complaint, United States v. Delta Dental of R.I., No. 96-113 ML (D.R.I. filed Feb.
29, 1996). The complaint was filed in the same district court that decided the Ocean State
case.
" The importance of commitments is highlighted by Cindy Alexander & David Reiffen,
Vertical Contracts as Strategic Commitments: How Are They Enforced?, 4 J. ECON. MGMT. STRAT-
EGY, 623 (1995). Frequently, commitment power is tied to observability, e.g., R. Preston
McAfee & Marius Schwartz, Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimina-
tion, Exclusivity, and Uniformity, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 210 (1994); Daniel O'Brien & Greg
Shaffer, Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts, 23 RAND J. ECON. 299 (1992).
46 In these industries, decision variables are termed "strategic complements" in the techni-
cal literature. Where the decision variables of rivals are instead "strategic substitutes,"
vertical practices that represent commitments threatening more, rather than less, aggressive
competition can support supracompetitive prices if, for example, they deter entry. Yet,
an investment that makes a firm become more competitive when decision variables are
strategic substitutes may instead generate lower industry prices, even when rivals respond
by lessening their own competitive efforts out of fear of provoking a strong response from
the firm that has become more aggressive. See Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L. Judd,
Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly, 77 AM. EcON. REV. 927 (1987).
17 For example, in many branded consumer products industries in which manufacturers
compete for retailers and retailers compete for customers on the basis of price, a manufac-
turer might make itself seem less aggressive by adopting a distributional strategy of greater
product differentiation. See Michael L. Katz, Vertical Contractual Relations, in 1 HANDBOOK
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Most-favored-customer clauses can dampen competition by making
firms less aggressive in settings in which rivals will respond by becoming
less aggressive as well. 48 A firm that introduces a most-favored-customer
clause commits to being less aggressive by obligating itself to pay a sub-
stantial penalty if it lowers price to any individual customer. The reason:
if it lowers price to one, it must lower prices to all its customers. And if
its rivals would respond by becoming less aggressive themselves, some
firms will find it profitable to make this commitment. 49 This dynamic
may be most likely, and the resulting price increase may likely be the
greatest, when the number of firms is small, when higher prices would
not lead to new entry,50 and when exogenous shifts in cost or demand
that would tend to lead to lower prices are unlikely.5
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 700 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989). If
one firm's move to such a less-competitively aggressive distribution method predictably
induces its rivals also to behave less aggressively, these practices will generate higher prices
for all. In this setting a manufacturer may be able to employ vertical practices to dampen
competition among manufacturers. If most retailers are tied to manufacturers through
exclusive dealing contracts, for example, that practice will reduce each manufacturer's
ability to attract many new retailers, and with them many new customers, by cutting price.
A manufacturer's price cutting might still encourage its own retailers to lower their price
to attract more customers, but that tactic could be thwarted if many customers exhibit
loyalty to retailers. Recognizing this, a manufacturer may become less aggressive at cutting
price. As each becomes less aggressive, so do its rivals, generating higher price outcomes
in the marketplace. See David Besanko & Martin Perry, Exclusive Dealing in a Spatial Model
of Retail Competition, 12 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 297 (1994). Similarly, manufacturers can
dampen competition among themselves by awarding retailers exclusive territories. Patrick
Rey & Joseph Stiglitz, The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition, 26 RAND J.
ECON. 431 (1995); cf. Giacomo Bonanno & John Vickers, Vertical Separation, 36 J. INDUS.
ECON. 257 (1988) (vertical separation between manufacturers and retailers leads to higher
prices than vertical integration when separation operates as a commitment to less-aggressive
competition).
" Although the "dampening competition" and "facilitating practices" intuitions regard-
ing the anticompetitive potential of most-favored-customer provisions are similar, they
are not identical. For example, if buyers are similar, a commitment by a seller to treat
buyers the same may not reduce seller incentives to discount in the static ("dampening
competition") story. Yet, such a commitment could facilitate coordination in the repeated
game ("facilitating practices") story when a retrospective most-favored-customer clause
requires a discounting seller to give rebates to earlier buyers.
'9 Thomas Cooper, Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion, 17 RAND J. ECON.
377 (1986); cf. Charles A. Holt & David T. Scheffman, Facilitating Practices: The Effects of
Advance Notice and Best-Price Policies, 18 RAND J. ECON. 187-97 (1987).
'0 Yet, even if entry is easy, so that firms do not earn monopoly profits, the widespread
adoption of most-favored-customer policies can lead to prices above the competitive level
(and result in excessive entry). Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guaran-
tee High Prices? How Price Matching Challenges Antitrust (Sept. 8, 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author). The FTC has challenged trade association rules that
generate high prices and inefficient entry, even though association members do not earn
excessive profits. See generally James L. Langenfeld & Louis Silvia, Federal Trade Commission
Horizontal Restraints Cases: An Economic Perspective, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 653, 665-78 (1993)
(raising own costs theory cases).
"' Cooper, supra note 49, at 386-87.
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This effect may have been present in the industry situation of the
FTC's Ethyl case, 52 although that theory was not litigated. There were
only four firms; the industry was declining, so entry was unlikely; and
demand was reasonably predictable. Only the top two firms routinely
relied on most-favored-customer clauses. The Commission found that
unanimous use of these clauses was not necessary to produce an anticom-
petitive effect. While the court of appeals disagreed with the Commis-
sion's legal conclusion that unilateral adoption of the challenged practices
would support a finding of liability, the court was not asked to consider
the dampening competition theory.
The dampening competition theory represents something of a frontier
for antitrust enforcement. The theory makes sense, but enforcers and
courts have yet to confront the litigation challenges that will arise in
demonstrating that a commitment to less-aggressive behavior has led, or
will likely lead, rivals to act likewise.53 Indeed, to the extent that the
"dampening competition" scenario is a story about unilateral conduct by
a firm that is not a monopolist, issues about the reach of the antitrust
laws may arise. 4
VI. EFFICIENCIES
The touchstone of the Chicago School's advice to treat vertical re-
straints leniently is the potential for creating procompetitive efficiencies.55
Two types of efficiencies are frequently cited for most-favored-customer
" Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425, 628-32 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
13 Experience may well lead business rivals to understand each others' likely reactions,
but enforcers and courts may find the explanations harder to understand.
" Sherman Act § 1 prohibits anticompetitive agreements and does not reach unilateral
conduct. Sherman Act § 2, which addresses monopolization, does not easily reach unilateral
conduct in an oligopoly setting. Cf. United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d
1114 (5th Cir. 1984) (attempted monopolization found when one firm expressly solicited
a price increase from its only rival), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1001 (1985). While FTC Act
§ 5 may extend beyond the Sherman Act, it may be a challenge to attack unilateral conduct
by oligopolists under this statute as well. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729
F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); see generally Baker, supra note 12, at 210-13.
" There are many efficiencies potentially available from vertical practices that numerous
court opinions have found significant. For example, vertical combinations can avoid the
costs of successive marginalization in a chain of monopolies. Vertical contracts can align
the incentives among sellers of complements, for example, by discouraging dealer free
riding on the promotional incentives of the manufacturer or other dealers. Vertical combi-
nations can avoid inefficient input substitution, for example, by downstream firms dealing
with upstream firms exercising some market power. The use of vertical practices to discrimi-
nate in price is also potentially efficiency enhancing, although price discrimination could
harm competition, too. And other efficiencies that are commonly cited are lowering buyers'
search costs and avoiding opportunism, holdup, and agency problems.
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treatment.56 Yet, the more common story of the two appears the less
convincing upon careful analysis.
It seems obvious to many that a most-favored-customer provision helps
a buyer lower its costs by purchasing inputs for less. In a recent decision
Judge Posner described such contractual clauses as "standard devices by
which buyers try to bargain for low prices" and dismissed the anticompeti-
tive theory that a most-favored-customer clause could set a price floor
for physician prices in the instant case as "an ingenious but perverse
argument. '"" The First Circuit found it "hard to disagree" with a district
court's view that such clauses are "what competition should be all about."5 "
And former FTC Chairman James Miller III argued in Ethyl that most-
favored-customer clauses must be procompetitive because buyers appear
to want them.59
What seems obvious at first glance can look different upon reflection,
however. The greater the fraction of buyers who obtain most-favored-
customer protection, and the larger their size, the less plausible it becomes
that these contractual provisions will help buyers obtain inputs for less.
The best case for crediting this efficiencyjustification comes in a market
with many buyers, in which it is costly for buyers to shop for a low price.
In this setting uninformed buyers may pay more than the informed.
An uninformed buyer able to bargain for most-favored-customer status
might indeed expect to obtain the benefits of becoming informed without
expensive search. If some other informed buyer can convince the seller
to lower price to meet the competition, the most-favored-customer can
free ride on that buyer's bargaining effort and so obtain a low price
without price shopping itself. Thus, if a small buyer were to obtain
most-favored-customer status, and if it expects to make multiple future
purchases, its transactions costs of future search might be lowered a
56 Commentary also considers the possibility that a risk-averse buyer might seek a most-
favored-customer clause as insurance protection against certain contingencies. The "sig-
nificant limitations to the size of this benefit" are discussed in Salop, supra note 12, at 265,
284. Another story that appears unlikely to provide a legitimate business justification for
most-favored-customer provisions is the suggestion that buyers may seek most-favored-
customer status in order to ensure that rival firms do not obtain inputs for less. This is a
peculiar efficiency justification, as it attempts to make a virtue out of the lessening of
competition among buyers.
-7 Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1415
(7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C. J.) (medical clinic's most-favored-customer clause in contracts
with affiliated physicians found insufficient to support the inference of an anticompetitive
vertical agreement absent further evidence), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996).
" Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d
1101, 1110 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing 692 F. Supp. at 71), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
"' See, e.g., Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425, 680 (1983) (dissenting statement of Chairman
Miller), rev'd sub nom. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
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great deal with little offsetting harm to competition. 60 Accordingly, it
can reasonably expect to buy inputs for less, as this efficiency justification
would have it.
But once one uninformed buyer discovers this way of shopping at low
cost, other buyers seeking to minimize their own costs may be led by
competition to seek most-favored-customer status as well. As Chairman
Miller observed, the buyers will appear to want these contractual provi-
sions. If only a few small buyers obtain most-favored-customer status,
perhaps their input prices would fall without much of an increase in
the prices paid by other customers and we might credit the efficiency
justification. But if, through buyer competition or seller initiative, most-
favored-customer provisions proliferate, these clauses may no longer
help the formerly uninformed buyers obtain the product for less. The
reason: prices to informed customers will tend to rise as sellers come to see
more cost than benefit from discounting.6' Hence, despite the currency of
the "vertical good" slogan, it is not surprising to find the Justice Depart-
ment alleging, in its Delta Dental of Rhode Island litigation, that the most-
favored-customer clauses at issue have "not generated any meaningful
savings or other procompetitive benefits" when in widespread use.62
There is nothing perverse, to use Judge Posner's colorful phrase, about
the idea that buyer competition might reduce buyer benefits from some
seller practice.63 Indeed, GTE Sylvania,64 a Chicago School landmark,
teaches this. When buyers learn about a product's features from a full-
service dealer and then make their purchase from a no-frills discounter,
such buyer free riding may drive the full-service dealers out of business.
If the buyers are firms that sell in turn to consumers, they may be led
to free ride by competitive pressure to keep costs low, even if they know
that they will be harmed in the long run by the disappearance of the
60 A large buyer is more likely to be informed and thus less likely to have this cost-
reducing motive for seeking most-favored-customer status.
6' Under such circumstances it is hard to see why buyers would want to bear the cost
of becoming informed. But without informed buyers, sellers have little incentive to dis-
count. This is another way of expressing an intuition behind the "dampening competition"
story.
61 Complaint at 32, United States v. Delta Dental of R.I., No. 96-113 ML, (D.R.I. filed
Feb. 29, 1996). The complaint further alleges that the defendant "has not considered the
[most-favored-customer] clause a cost-savings device, has not sought to calculate any savings
from its application, and has not factored any such savings into determining the premiums
it charges its customers."
63 Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1415
(7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C. J.) (terming the theory that a most-favored-customer clause
sought by buyers could harm buyers by putting a floor under seller prices "an ingenious
but perverse argument"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996).
6 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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full-service dealers. Similarly, buyer competition to obtain most-favored-
customer protection, in the end, can cost buyers as a group. Nor is there
anything perverse about the idea that buyers might compete to sign a
contractual provision that ends up hurting them. When a monopolist
asks its customers to agree not to deal with potential competitors in order
to deter entry by keeping entrants below efficient scale, for example,
buyers may compete to sign in order to ensure that they receive the
monopolist's product-even when the buyers know that all would be
65better off if none were to agree. In short, when buyers desire something
individually, one cannot assume, as these courts have done, that it is in
the buyers' interest collectively to obtain it.
66
A second efficiency story is also frequently cited. This story applies
when firms must write long-term contracts with their customers knowing
that supply and demand conditions might change unpredictably.6 7 For
example, natural gas pipelines must contract with well owners without
knowing the future demand for gas. A long-term fixed-price contract is
unattractive because it would not lead production to respond efficiently
to changes in demand. Yet, the well owners would not be willing to agree
to renegotiate the price every year because doing so puts them in a
difficult bargaining position: once they drill, they would find themselves
at the mercy of a single pipeline buyer in future years.68 One solution
is to sign a long-term contract that contemplates annual price changes,
but to constrain the pipeline's ability to exploit individual well owners
with a most-favored-customer provision. This efficiency explanation
would not apply to every use of a most-favored-customer clause, but,
when plausible, it must be balanced against the harm to competition
under the rule of reason.69
VII. CONCLUSION
Unlike what happened in Animal Farm, we will not end up returning
to the past. No one proposes making most-favored-customer clauses
65 Eric B. Rasmusen et al., Naked Exclusion, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 1137 (1991).
6 Nor can one assume that a provision desired by buyers, who may exercise some market
power in the resale market, is necessarily in the interest of the end-use consumers to whom
the buyers sell in turn.
67 Keith Crocker & Thomas Lyon, What Do "Facilitating Practices" Facilitate? An Empirical
Investigation of Most-Favored-Nations Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts, 37 J.L. & EcoN. 297
(1994).
6 Moreover, well owners may also worry about the buyer's incentive to sign a contract
with one seller, then take advantage of that fact by giving another seller more favorable
terms. Under some circumstances, such opportunism would allow the buyer and second
seller to appropriate rents that would otherwise go to the first seller.
69 In applying the rule of reason it is also necessary to ask whether the parties to the
restraint could reasonably have achieved the efficiencies some other way, at less risk to
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illegal per se. Indeed, enforcers seeking to address the anticompetitive
potential of these contractual provisions must grapple with the hesitation
of somejudges to accept the economic teaching that a vertical relationship
including a promise to reduce prices could have the overall effect of
increasing them and with the often difficult task of untangling efficiencies
from harm.7 °
It is well established that in evaluating the reasonableness of any verti-
cal practice, both its anticompetitive and efficiency-enhancing potential
must be considered. If the "vertical good, horizontal bad" slogan carries
with it a danger for antitrust's future, it goes the other way-that antitrust
might develop new per se rules of legality that ignore the possibility
that vertical restraints can harm competition through their horizontal
effects.7 '
competition. In examining the reasonableness of a most-favored-customer provision one
might ask, for example, why a buyer that had enough bargaining power to obtain a most-
favored-competitor clause chose not bargain for a low price instead.
70 Cf. Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers in Multi-Product Industries and Edgeworth's
Paradox of Taxation, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 545 (1991); B. Douglas Bernheim & Robert D.
Willig, Economic Foundations for Vertical Merger Guidelines, Paper Presented at FTC/
DOJ/ABA/GULC Conference, Post-Chicago Economics: New Theories-New Cases?,
Washington, DC, May 26-27, 1994.
71 Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 3 (proposing a series of per se exemptions); Workable
Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696 (1986) (contending that models based on analysis
of strategic behavior are not useful for the law because they are too difficult).
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